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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body . . . .”1 From Benjamin
Cardozo’s early expression of the principle of patient autonomy emerged
the doctrine of informed consent, defined by both contract and fiduciary
laws and elaborated upon by courts, state and federal legislatures, and
professional associations. Later, as the world sought to reassemble itself
following the horrors of World War II, the promulgation of the Nuremberg
Code established an international standard for the treatment of human
research subjects.2 The experiences of the Nazi atrocities, together with
America’s own unfortunate history in human experimentation, provided
informal precedent for the courts in their interpretation of informed
consent requirements.3
*

J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2005.
Schloendorff v. Soc’y of the N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
2
See 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 181-82 (1949), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/nuremberg.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2004)
[hereinafter NUREMBERG CODE]. The Nuremberg Code uses natural law to describe a
broad theory of human rights.
3
See Larry I. Palmer, Genes and Disability: Defining Health and the Goals of
Medicine: Genetic Health and Eugenics Precedents: A Voice of Caution, 30 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 237, 257 (2003). Palmer discusses the unique impact of the Nazi doctors’ trials
at Nuremberg and the Tuskegee syphilis experiments on American courts. See id. at 25861. Although not formally binding precedents, the philosophical and moral lessons from
these “eugenics precedents” are often referenced in human experimentation cases. See
1
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[2] The courts, federal statutory requirements, and international
agreements draw on these unfortunate episodes in efforts to protect the
autonomy and well-being of human subjects. The ethical requirements
governing medical practitioners further supplement these protections.4
Today, with the decoding of the human genome and recent explosive
growth in biotechnology research, medicine and the profit-motive intersect
as never before.5 The resulting leaps in technological advancement and
quality of care are remarkable, but the impact on human subjects research,
especially the vulnerable populations that participate in such studies, raises
serious ethical questions. The doctrine of informed consent requires
thorough reevaluation, both in the therapeutic and non-therapeutic
contexts, particularly where the disclosure of financial conflicts of interest
is concerned.6
generally George J. Annas, Mengele’s Birthmark: The Nuremberg Code in United States
Courts, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 17 (1991) (discussing the United States’
ambivalence towards human experimentation).
4
See generally CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS
(Am. Med. Ass’n Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 2002), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8288.html (last updated Jan. 24, 2003)
[hereinafter CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS].
5
See, e.g., Jennifer A. Henderson & John J. Smith, Financial Conflict of Interest in
Medical Research: Overview and Analysis of Federal and State Controls, 57 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 445, 446-47 (2002) (“Each [financial conflict of interest] regulation differs in
its focus and definition of what constitutes a financial conflict, thus creating a patchwork
of regulations—some designed to protect the integrity of research results and others
designed for the safety of human research participants.”).
6
See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 812 n.2 (Md. 2001). The
Grimes court offers a concise distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic
research:
[a]t least to the extent that commercial profit
motives are not implicated, therapeutic research’s
purpose is to directly help or aid a patient who is
suffering from a health condition the objectives of the
research are designed to address—hopefully by the
alleviation, or potential alleviation, of the health
condition.
Non-therapeutic research generally utilizes
subjects who are not known to have the condition the
objectives of the research are designed to address,
and/or is not designed to directly benefit the subjects
utilized in the research, but, rather, is designed to
achieve beneficial results for the public at large (or,
under some circumstances, for profit).
Id.
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[3] Observers often point to the unique characteristics of biotechnology
research as creating a need for higher scrutiny of the informed consent
process.7 Biotechnology research in academic facilities involves a great
deal of competition for funding, often from private sources, which creates
a decidedly more entrepreneurial environment.8
[4] The result of this commercialization is that research of human subjects
becomes “laced with more tangible financial conflicts of interest arising at
multiple points throughout the research process.”9 Additionally, the now
generally accepted proposition that researchers can obtain patent
protection for genetic sequences greatly enhances the economic payoff
and marketability of important discoveries.10 The sophisticated nature of
both the science itself and of attending financial interests creates special
concerns when explaining research to subjects, particularly where study
populations may include indigenous or otherwise specially-situated
individuals.11
[5] The diverse roots of the informed consent doctrine, emerging as they
did in the contexts of both medical treatment and scientific research, have
fostered a number of ambiguities as each field evolves and changes over
time. Strong financial incentives call the objectivity of institutional
review practices into question,12 and the need for clearly drawn ethical
principles to govern these practices grows stronger as we move into the
Human Genome Era.13
7

See, e.g., Karen A. Jordan, Financial Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects
Research: Proposals for a More Effective Regulatory Scheme, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
15, 18 (2003).
8
See id.
9
Id.
10
See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 312-13 (1980) (holding that
living organisms are not per se violations of the product of nature doctrine); Amgen, Inc.
v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that conception of
an invention involving a genetic sequence occurs when some level of reduction to
practice is achieved).
11
See generally Kara H. Ching, Indigenous Self-Determination in an Age of Genetic
Patenting: Recognizing an Emerging Human Rights Norm, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 687
(1997) (discussing how the law may aid indigenous peoples in securing meaningful
control over their genetic material).
12
See Henderson & Smith, supra note 5, at 446.
13
This era is characterized as “a period in which biomedical research will be
dominated by the assumption that genetic knowledge will improve health care delivery
and presumably overall health status.” Larry I. Palmer, Disease Management and
Liability in the Human Genome Era, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002). In essence, scientific
progress and experimentation will dominate much of the health care system. See id. at 2-
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[6] Complicating these concerns is the distinction created by both courts
and legislatures between the duties of those engaging in “therapeutic”
research and those engaging in “non-therapeutic” research.14 Some courts
maintain that the non-therapeutic context does not trigger a doctor-patient
style fiduciary relationship, and that researchers owe no duty to disclose
otherwise relevant financial information in such situations.15 If this trend
continues to develop, the negative impact on the relationship of trust
between researchers and subjects will far outweigh any benefits to be
gained from nondisclosure.
[7] This article addresses the issues arising from genetic human subjects
research and recommends that researchers follow stricter requirements for
the disclosure of financial conflicts of interest. Part II focuses on
historical precedents providing a framework for the regulation of human
subjects research. Part III lays out the relevant standards for informed
consent. Part IV discusses a number of cases with implications for genetic
research. Part V analyzes some of the unique characteristics of genetic
research that raise ethical concerns. Finally, Part VI proposes stricter
requirements for the disclosure of financial conflicts of interest during the
informed consent process.
II. THE NECESSITY OF CONSENT
[8] In light of the troubling history of human subjects research, a number
of international agreements and professional edicts have emerged
discussing the ideal ethical requirements that should govern such
practices. American courts make regular reference to these statements,

3. Writing before the Greenberg decision was reached, Palmer argued that researchers
“must . . . disclose, without the plaintiffs’ asking, their intentions regarding the patenting
of genetic knowledge and other data they obtain.” Id. at 28.
14
See Victoria Orlowski, Note, Promising Protection Through Internationally
Derived Duties, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 381, 393 (2003) (“The ‘therapeutic/nontherapeutic’ distinction . . . opens the possibility for deception because it encourages
[institutional review boards] and researchers to cast their experiments as beneficial in
some way because subjects are less likely to participate in research which will harm or
not benefit them.”).
15
See Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d
1064, 1070 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (holding that the duty of informed consent does not extend to
economic interests in a non-therapeutic relationship). But see Grimes v. Kennedy
Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 845-46 (Md. 2001) (describing special relationships
that may exist even in a non-therapeutic context).
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although the exact nature of the legal obligations they create is, at best,
unclear.16
[9] Following the Nazi doctors’ trials, the Nuremberg court echoed
Cardozo’s early sentiments in its promulgation of the Nuremberg Code,
declaring that “[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential.”17 The Nuremberg court used natural law theory to expand upon
Cardozo’s insistence on autonomy, emphasizing that subjects must have
the legal capacity to consent, the right to refuse continuation in any study,
and a demonstration of knowledge and comprehension of all risks
associated with participation.18 The Code, although widely accepted and
relied upon by the international scientific community, met with some
criticism and resistance, primarily from researchers who felt its
requirements were too legalistic and impracticable for everyday
implementation.19
[10] In response to calls for a more flexible formulation of informed
consent requirements, the World Medical Association issued the
Declaration of Helsinki in 1964.20 The Declaration placed the well-being
of human subjects above “the interests of science and society,”21 and
called for special protections for vulnerable research populations,
particularly the “economically and medically disadvantaged.”22
[11] Many of these principles are reflected in what has come to be known
as the “Common Rule” governing federally funded human subjects

16

For example, the Nuremberg Code has been cited only once by the Supreme Court,
in a dissent by Justice O’Connor. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 710 (1987)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). The majority denied relief to a former soldier alleging injury
following military testing of LSD, finding that the Code’s principles did not apply to the
military context. Id. at 686.
17
NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 2, at 181.
18
Id.
19
See Orlowski, supra note 14, at 396.
20
See George J. Annas, The Changing Landscape of Human Experimentation:
Nuremberg, Helsinki, and Beyond, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 119, 122-23 (1992).
21
DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR MED. RESEARCH
INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS § A.5 (World Med. Ass’n 2002),
http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b3.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2004) [hereinafter
DECLARATION OF HELSINKI].
22
Id. § A.8.
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23

research in the United States. The provisions of the Common Rule are
scattered throughout the regulations of several agencies and include the
requirement of institutional review board (“IRB”) approval of protocols
for the protection of the rights and safety of study participants.24
[12] The American Medical Association’s (“AMA”) Code of Medical
Ethics confers decision-making responsibility on the patient.25 Further, it
requires informed consent before the commercial use of human tissue,
stressing the fact that financial interests must not influence medical
decision-making.26 The text of the AMA’s requirements dealing with the
commercial use of human tissue bears repeating:
The rapid growth of the biotechnology industry has resulted
in the commercial availability of numerous therapeutic and
other products developed from human tissue. Physicians
contemplating the commercial use of human tissue should
abide by the following guidelines:
(1) Informed consent must be obtained from patients for the
use of organs or tissues in clinical research.
(2) Potential commercial applications must be disclosed to
the patient before a profit is realized on products developed
from biological materials.
(3) Human tissue and its products may not be used for
commercial purposes without the informed consent of the
patient who provided the original cellular material.
(4) Profits from the commercial use of human tissue and its
products may be shared with patients, in accordance with
lawful contractual agreements.
(5) The diagnostic and therapeutic alternatives offered to
patients by their physicians should conform to standards of
good medical practice and should not be influenced in any
way by the commercial potential of the patient’s tissue.27

23

See Lori A. Alvino, Note, Who’s Watching the Watchdogs? Responding to the
Erosion of Research Ethics by Enforcing Promises, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 898-99
(2003).
24
Id. at 898-900.
25
See CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 4, § 10.01.
26
See id. § 2.08.
27
Id.
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III. STANDARDS FOR DISCLOSURE
[13] From the earliest articulation of the patient’s right of informed
consent, courts have worked at defining a practicable standard with the
influence of tort doctrine playing a large role in this evolution.28 Stricter
formulations of informed consent require the physician to disclose
information that his patients might consider material to the course of
treatment, while less rigorous applications of the doctrine utilize a more
flexible standard requiring compliance with industry norms in the medical
field.29
[14] The informed consent doctrine requires general disclosure of the
diagnosis and possible treatment alternatives, as well as the nature, risks,
and likelihood of success of a given treatment or procedure.30 In a slight
majority of jurisdictions, courts rely on the physician-oriented standard to
determine what information must be disclosed, applying an industry
practice standard similar to that used for medical negligence generally.31
Other jurisdictions utilize the more stringent patient-oriented standard.32
[15] The touchstone for the patient-oriented approach comes from
Canterbury v. Spence, which assembled a variety of earlier holdings into a
coherent standard.33 The court held that the appropriate measure of
disclosure is not what the reasonable physician would consider relevant,
but what the reasonable patient would want to know before making a
decision.34 Relying heavily on Cardozo’s opinion in Schloendorff v.
Society of the New York Hospital, the Canterbury court defined the
standard of care:
[d]ue care may require a physician perceiving symptoms of
bodily abnormality to alert the patient to the condition. It
may call upon the physician confronting an ailment which
does not respond to his ministrations to inform the patient
thereof. It may command the physician to instruct the
patient as to any limitations to be presently observed for his
28

See MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS IN A NUTSHELL 132
(2d ed. 1999).
29
See id. at 134-35.
30
Id. at 133.
31
Id. at 134.
32
Id. at 135.
33
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
34
See id. at 786-87.
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own welfare, and as to any precautionary therapy he should
seek in the future. It may oblige the physician to advise the
patient of the need for or desirability of any alternative
treatment promising greater benefit than that being pursued.
Just as plainly, due care normally demands that the
physician warn the patient of any risks to his well-being
which contemplated therapy may involve.35
[16] This sentiment was echoed by other jurisdictions.36 Still, the lessrestrictive physician-oriented standard, which limits the informed consent
requirement “to those disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner
would make under the same or similar circumstances,” became
dominant.37 The application of these two doctrines would trouble courts
and commentators as new developments in biotechnology and medicine
brought the worlds of treatment, research, and business closer together.
IV. INFORMED CONSENT IN GENETIC RESEARCH
[17] There are three important cases that have implications for informed
consent in genetic research and that discuss both the patient-oriented and
the physician-oriented standards for disclosure. These cases provide a
good picture of the spectrum along which courts lie in their applications of
the informed consent standards, and show where the courts may go when
confronted with future disputes arising from genetic research.
[18] The eugenics precedents discussed above deal primarily with nontherapeutic research, where no direct benefit is conferred on the subject.
This contrasts with therapeutic research, where subjects are also
considered the patients of researchers, engaged in the type of relationship
envisioned by the Code of Medical Ethics.38 Although some jurisdictions
maintain that the non-therapeutic context does not trigger a doctor-patient
style fiduciary relationship,39 this typically is not the approach taken by
35

Id. at 781 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Powers v. United States, 589 F. Supp. 1084, 1097-98 (2d Cir. 1984)
(finding that the defendant’s conduct failed to satisfy the “lay” standard enunciated in
Canterbury).
37
Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960).
38
See Orlowski, supra note 14, at 393. Interestingly, the Code of Medical Ethics
refers to those involved in medical studies as “patients,” whereas the Nuremberg Code
and most statutes regulating research refer to them as “subjects.” Compare CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 4, § 2.08, with NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 2, at 181.
39
Supra note 15.
36
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medical researchers or their subjects. The cases below address situations
arising from both therapeutic and non-therapeutic types of research, and
illustrate how the blurred distinction between the two can create confusion
for researchers and subjects alike.
[19] Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, Inc. is
the most recent and perhaps most troubling case on this issue.41 In
Greenberg, a United States district court in Florida held that a physician
had no duty to obtain informed consent prior to his commercial use of
donated tissues while researching the cause of Canavan disease, and
further, that there was no fiduciary duty requiring disclosure of financial
conflicts of interest.42 The court reasoned that no therapeutic relationship
existed between the physician/researcher and his subjects.43 It even went
so far as to conclude that the plaintiffs were more akin to donors, or even
co-researchers, than research subjects per se.44
[20] The individual plaintiffs in Greenberg were parents of children with
Canavan disease. Canavan disease interferes with brain fiber growth in
children of Ashkenazi or Eastern European Jewish descent; it is usually
fatal.45 In 1987, plaintiff Daniel Greenberg approached Dr. Rueben
Matalon requesting help in the search for the genetic cause of the disease
and the development of a prenatal screening test to identify potential
carriers.46 Greenberg and one of the organizational plaintiffs, the Chicago
Chapter of the National Tay-Sachs and Allied Disease Association, Inc.,
sought out other Canavan families to provide tissue (such as blood, urine,
and autopsy samples), health histories, and financial support.47 The
plaintiffs alleged an understanding that any results from the research
would remain in the public domain, on the basis of prior experience in
community testing for Tay-Sachs disease.48

40

See Interview with Jim Evans, M.D., Ph.D, Department of Genetics, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Feb. 18, 2004) (on file with
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology) [hereinafter Evans Interview].
41
Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064
(S.D. Fla. 2003).
42
Id. at 1070-72.
43
Id. at 1070.
44
Id. at 1071.
45
Palmer, supra note 3, at 261-62.
46
Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1066.
47
Id. at 1067.
48
Id.
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[21] Following a breakthrough in 1993, however, Dr. Matalon obtained a
patent for forty-four claims, including:
nucleic acid sequences, genes, polypeptides, antibodies,
vectors containing the gene, host cells transformed with
vectors containing the gene, animal models for the disease,
methods for expressing the polypeptide, genetic screening
methods and kits, diagnostic methods and kits, methods of
treating Canavan disease and methods of genetic therapy
for the disease.49
[22] The plaintiffs further alleged that they had no knowledge of the
patent, or of Matalon’s commercial intentions, until 1998, when Miami
Children’s Hospital began threatening and imposing royalty fees on health
providers using the Canavan test.50 The plaintiffs brought suit for six
claims, including lack of informed consent, breach of fiduciary duty,
unjust enrichment, fraudulent concealment, conversion, and
misappropriation of trade secrets.51 The court dismissed with prejudice all
but the unjust enrichment claim.52
[23] In dismissing the informed consent claim, the court reasoned that
imposing such a duty would “chill medical research as . . . [researchers]
constantly evaluate whether a discloseable event has occurred.”53 It also
portrayed this “extra duty” as creating “dead-hand control that research
subjects could hold because they would be able to dictate how medical
research progresses.”54 The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ contention that
the Code of Medical Ethics required informed consent prior to commercial
use of human tissue, finding that its 1994 promulgation occurred too late
to bind the parties.55
49

U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635 (issued Oct. 21, 1997).
Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, Currents in Contemporary Ethics:
Canavan Decision Favors Researchers over Families, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 450, 451
(2003).
51
Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1068.
52
Id. at 1077-78.
53
Id. at 1070.
54
Id. at 1071.
55
Id. at 1071 n.2. Although the Code of Medical Ethics does not confer a formal
legal obligation on physicians, its provisions are often used to establish the standard of
due care in the medical industry in tort claims. See, e.g., Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E.2d
371, 377 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that “[w]e are not the first court to recognize that
the Code of Medical Ethics sets forth the medical profession’s standard on informed
consent”).
50
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[24] The holding of the Greenberg court has dangerous ethical
implications and creates opportunities for the exploitation of vulnerable
study populations. Fortunately, alternative approaches taken by other
jurisdictions provide more effective and ethical protections of patient
autonomy, while simultaneously taking into account the interests of
scientific progress.
[25] For example, in the widely-discussed case of Moore v. Regents of the
University of California, the Supreme Court of California held that:
(1) a physician must disclose personal interests
unrelated to the patient’s health, whether research or
economic, that may affect the physician’s
professional judgment; and
(2) a physician’s failure to disclose such interests
may give rise to a cause of action for performing
medical procedures without informed consent or
breach of fiduciary duty.56
[26] In reaching this decision, the court relied on California’s patientoriented standard of disclosure,57 and took the standard even further by
recognizing that a reasonable patient would wish to be informed of
potential profit motives or economic incentives.58
[27] The plaintiff in Moore was diagnosed with hairy-cell leukemia in
1976 by defendant Golde, a physician at UCLA Medical Center.59 The
complaint alleged that at the time of the diagnosis, the defendants “were
aware that ‘certain blood products and blood components were of great

56

Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990). The court
upheld the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the count of conversion, providing the other
significant wing of the Moore decision. See id. at 480.
57
See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9-10 (Cal. 1972) (holding that the scope of
communications must be determined by materiality with respect to the patient’s needs).
58
Moore, 793 P.2d at 483 (citing Magan Med. Clinic v. Cal. State Bd. of Med.
Exam’rs, 57 Cal. Rptr. 256, 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)). Concerns over the influence of
financial considerations on medical decision-making have created a wealth of literature,
particularly in the context of the managed care industry. See generally, e.g., Mark A.
Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 693 (1994) (arguing
“for lifting the ethical taboo against physician bedside rationing”).
59
Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
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value in a number of commercial and scientific efforts.’” Golde, who
determined that Moore’s life was threatened by the condition, obtained
consent to remove Moore’s spleen in 1976.61 From this time until 1983,
Moore made several trips to UCLA Medical Center at Golde’s direction,
where Golde drew samples of “‘blood, blood serum, skin, bone marrow
aspirate, and sperm.’”62 Moore alleged that he did so based upon Golde’s
representations that such samples were necessary for his continued
medical treatment and “‘the trust inherent in and by virtue of the
physician-patient relationship.’”63
[28] Unbeknownst to Moore, Golde established a cell-line from Moore’s
T-lymphocytes,64 and obtained a patent for twenty-two claims, including
the cell line and numerous procedures for the production of bone marrow
proteins.65 Based upon biotechnology industry reports, Moore alleged that
the potential market for such procedures exceeded three billion dollars.66
[29] Moore involved a clear case of a therapeutic, doctor/patient
relationship, and is thus distinguishable from the situation in Greenberg.
At least this was the rationale employed by the Greenberg court in its
ruling.67 Drawing this distinction too finely, however, invites troubling
behavior if the IRBs charged with protecting patient safety misunderstand
or misinterpret requirements, as was the case in Grimes v. Kennedy
Krieger Institute, Inc.68
[30] Grimes arose outside the field of genetic research, but its facts make
concerns over the mishandling of the therapeutic/non-therapeutic
distinction all the more clear. The Kennedy Krieger Institute (“Institute”),
associated with Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, initiated a nontherapeutic research project studying the relative efficacy of various levels
60

Id.
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 480-81. As explained by the court, T-lymphocytes are white blood cells that
produce regulatory proteins essential to the immune system. Id. at 482 n.2. Moore’s Tlymphocytes overproduced certain proteins, or lymphokines, making it easier to identify
the corresponding genetic code responsible for their production. Id.
65
Id. at 482; see U.S. Patent No. 4,438,032 (issued Mar. 20, 1984).
66
Moore, 793 P.2d at 482.
67
Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1070 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
68
See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 813-14 (Md. 2001).
61
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of lead abatement in residential homes. The Institute arranged with a
local non-profit corporation administering low-income housing and a
group of landlords to effect partial lead abatement modifications in certain
homes, and to give priority to families with young, healthy children.70
Over a two-year period, the study would measure the levels of lead dust
present in the homes, as well as the levels of lead contamination present in
the (previously) healthy children residing there.71 Prior studies had
already indicated that lead dust would remain in the houses over a period
of time.72
[31] The court likened the children used in the study to “canaries in the
mines,” and determined that there had been no adequate explanation
during the consent process of how the lead dust in the homes related to
either the lead abatement modifications or to the actual lead contamination
in the children’s blood.73 It further suggested that the IRB actually tried to
assist researchers in avoiding stringent federal regulations governing nontherapeutic research on children by rephrasing its description of possible
benefits to the control group, and that the IRB failed to grasp the
distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research.74
[32] In finding a special relationship between the researchers and their
subjects, the Grimes court relied on eugenics precedents such as the
Tuskegee Syphilis Study and the Nazi doctors’ trials, as well as
experiments conducted on prisoners, soldiers, and charity hospital
patients.75 Drawing on these experiences, it similarly characterized lowincome children as a vulnerable research population, due to their youth
and their poverty.76 From this analysis, and specifically referencing the
Nuremberg Code, the court held that the informed consent research
agreements can act as contracts, or may create “special relationships” from

69

Id. at 811-12.
Id. at 812.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 813.
74
See id. at 813-14. Federal regulations include special protections for children,
pregnant women, fetuses, and prisoners involved in medical research. See 45 C.F.R. §§
46.201(a), 46.301(a), 46.401(a) (2003). The regulations make it extraordinarily difficult
to conduct research involving greater than minimal risk of harm with no potential for
benefit where children are involved. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.404 (2003).
75
See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 816-17.
76
Id. at 817.
70
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which duties arise. It further held that “normally, such special
relationships are created between researchers and the human subjects used
by the researchers.”78
[33] In dicta, the court engaged in a lengthy discussion of financial
conflicts of interest, but it eventually declared that the record did not
sufficiently indicate the extent to which commercial interests may have
interfered with the Institute’s research interests, and what effect these
interests might have had on the researchers’ motivations.79 The court
worried, however, that potentially commercialized research involving
vulnerable subjects might place obstacles between the researchers’ goals
and the health of the subjects, thus creating a need for “full and continuous
disclosure” of conflicts.80
V. GENETIC SCIENCE AND HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS
[34] The exploding market for biotechnology-related products creates
large financial incentives for researchers working with human populations
in the genetic science field. The disclosure of potential conflicts between
research and commercial interests, and protection of the informed consent
process generally, is often difficult because of frequent utilization of what
one scholar refers to as “[t]he [q]uestionable [d]emographics of [m]edical
[r]esearch.”81 Populations studied often include low-income or ethnic
minority groups. Thus, the eugenics precedents are commonly cited as
parallels to modern genetic research, in terms of subject characteristics.82
Discovery of these potential conflicts may be further complicated by the
fact that genetic material of interest to researchers is frequently found in
discrete or isolated indigenous populations.83
[35] A number of recent incidents illustrate these “questionable
demographics” in the field of cell line research, which authors frequently
use to emphasize divergence between the cultural beliefs and social
institutions of indigenous societies and the profit-seeking, “industrialized
intellectual property systems.”84 For example, a patent submission on the
77
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cell line of a member of the Guaymi people in Panama was protested by a
tribal leader as being “contrary to the Guaymi view of nature, and our
place in it.”85 The tribe was not informed of the patent, nor of the
establishment of a cell line, until the patent application was found by a
rural development non-profit organization, who then contacted members
of the tribe.86
[36] Other recent examples of controversial research on indigenous
populations include that on residents of the Solomon Islands and the
Hagahai tribe of Papua New Guinea.87 Due to cultural differences, it is
not always easy for researchers to understand how risks and benefits might
factor into the decision-making matrices of indigenous populations; the
application of Western conceptions of the “reasonable patient” or the
“reasonable physician” may be even more difficult.
[37] The Declaration of Helsinki took particular notice of what it deemed
“vulnerable” research populations, including not only unsophisticated or
uneducated populations, but also those that are economically
disadvantaged. 88 It is with regard to these populations that researchers
must tread most carefully, for in the absence of full disclosure, the risk of
exploitation or mistreatment runs the highest. Even the mildest risk of
harm can be amplified if researchers fail to satisfactorily explain all
relevant dangers.89
VI. DEFINING A NEW STANDARD FOR THE HUMAN GENOME ERA
[38] A commonly referenced tension surrounding legal requirements of
informed consent and the medical realities facing practitioners is that
between the principles of autonomy and beneficence.90 Informed consent
is rooted in autonomy. As reflected in Cardozo’s statement in
Schloendorff, the doctrine seeks to place as much relevant information as
85
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possible in the hands of the decision-maker: the patient. This goal
conflicts, however, with the principle of beneficence, which is the idea
that doctors are experts trained in the field who seek to provide their
patients with the best possible care, and who will use their judgment and
expertise to do so.92 Some limitation of patient autonomy might be
necessary, for example, if the physician believes the patient’s best interests
are at stake.93 To this extent, the law recognizes some compromises in the
ideals of informed consent, allowing for implied or bundled consent in
certain scenarios, or by the substitution of an objective reasonable person
standard to satisfy the tort elements of causation and materiality of risk,
rather than a subjective individual patient standard.94 The instances,
however, are few and far between, and are not likely to be the case during
the course of a genetic research program, particularly when a researcher is
contemplating the disclosure of financial conflicts.
[39] Although many jurisdictions utilize strict standards for human
subjects research, and many IRBs apply closer scrutiny to research
protocols than the law requires, the goal of patient autonomy is best
fulfilled by a rigorous application of the informed consent principles. 95 A
strict standard for the disclosure of financial conflicts of interest, without
respect to the distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic
research, is fundamental to the achievement of the goals of the informed
consent doctrine. The disclosure requirements found in the Code of
91
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Medical Ethics that govern researchers who anticipate commercial use of
human tissue come much closer to achieving these goals.96
[40] Additionally, the “full and continuous disclosure” of conflicts
discussed in Grimes greatly contributes to these ideals. 97 More complete
disclosure reinforces the idea of patient autonomy in decision-making, and
it further protects against exploitation of vulnerable subjects or any
increased risk of harm arising from a potential financial conflict of
interest.98
[41] In addition, the Common Rule already requires the disclosure of any
risks or benefits which may apply to the subject or to third parties.99 A
potential fortune a physician or his financial backers stand to make seems
to fall within the scope of this requirement.
[42] Within the medical profession, there is little reason to think that
physician-researchers distinguish between therapeutic and non-therapeutic
work; they also do not consider the duties owed to subjects to be
significantly different between the two contexts.100 With reference to the
Hippocratic principles governing such relationships, the idea that a
researcher operating in a non-therapeutic context “cannot do harm to
people, and cannot be influenced by [financial] conflicts is silly.”101
[43] The difference between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research is
not self-evident; it is perhaps even counter-intuitive. As mentioned, the
Grimes court determined that the Johns Hopkins IRB itself failed to grasp
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the distinction.
If the IRB at a sophisticated research institution has
difficulty distinguishing between the two, clearly a less sophisticated
patient/subject might also misunderstand the distinction.103 For the
purpose of disclosure, courts should not hold researchers in the nontherapeutic context to a less-stringent standard of care; such an approach
does not accurately reflect the expectations of patients or subjects—
however they are characterized—nor does it do justice to the ethical
principles governing the medical profession.
[44] As genetic research becomes increasingly commercialized and
profit-driven, and if the Greenberg court’s limitation on the scope of
disclosure in the non-therapeutic context is followed, the danger of harm
to human research subjects via undisclosed financial influence on medical
decisions is significant. This kind of harm is to be taken as seriously and
is to be avoided as conscientiously as the risk of physical injury,
particularly if the ethical goals of preserving patient autonomy and
fostering an atmosphere of trust between researchers and subjects is to be
realized.104
[45] The Greenberg court’s warnings of a chilling effect on research
certainly should be considered, but not at the expense of the trust inherent
in the relationship between doctors and patients, or between researchers
and subjects.105 Indeed, the “chilling” that may occur in a regime of tightlipped, profit-seeking researchers may be on the willingness of subjects to
enroll in such studies, greatly hampering technological progress. The
interests of science in general, and genetic research in particular, can only
benefit by the cultivation of this trust through the free, full, and continuous
disclosure of potential financial conflicts of interest.
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